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This work analyses the reforms carried out in some of the Muslim states regarding the issue of triple
divorce in one session. According to a majority of Sunni jurists, pronouncing the word “talaq” three
times in succession, equates with three “talaqs.” On the contrary, according to Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn al-
Qayyim, and the Shi‘a Imamiyah, three pronouncements of the word talaq in one session equals only
one talaq. Most Arab, as well as many Muslim states such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, Morocco,
Kuwait, Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, have, while
formulating their own laws, followed Ibn Taimiyah’s and Ibn al-Qayyim’s positions on this issue. In this
regard, Sri Lanka’s Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Act, 1951, as amended up to 2006, seems to be the
most ideal legislation on triple talaq. In Pakistan, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961, has abolished
triple talaq, as the procedure laid down in section 7 is largely applicable to one or two pronouncements
only and excludes three pronouncements. Furthermore, some portions of section 7 are in clear
contravention of the dictates of Islamic law, which adds to this precarious section’s peculiarity. The
superior courts in Pakistan and Bangladesh have not been consistent in interpreting the law on this
important subject, while on the other hand, some Indian High Courts have treated triple talaq as
invalid.
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Many Muslim states have carried out reforms in their personal laws in response to the juristic debate
on whether three repudiations of “talaq” in one session amount to “one” repudiation. Various schools
of thought in Islam have, historically, differed considerably on this issue and this has been one of the
hottest topics of debate between a majority of the Sunni jurists who favor the three-is-three position,
facing a strong opposition from a small but very vocal minority of those Sunni jurists who favor the
three-is-one position.1
This work gives an overview of reforms carried out by many Muslim states and Muslim communities
living in non-Muslim states regarding the implications of this very sensitive issue of three
pronouncements in one session. Some of the important questions that need a thorough analysis are
whether section 7 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (hereinafter the MFLO), in Pakistan, is rooted in
Islamic Law or not; why it has been, and still is, criticized so much; and whether that criticism is valid or
not. Moreover, how has the judiciary in Pakistan and Bangladesh interpreted this section and whether
the higher courts in both countries have been consistent in their interpretation? What is the position in
other Muslim countries and of Muslim communities living in non-Muslim states? These are some of the
questions that are answered in this work. The work also critically evaluates Indian cases on talaq to
discover the status of similar law(s) in that country viewed through the lens of the Islamic law. Related
legal topics with bearing on this issue are also discussed along the way.
REFORMS IN DIVORCE LAWS OF MUSLIM STATES
The position of Ibn Taimiyah on this issue has influenced most of the legislation in a majority of the
Muslim states regarding personal laws since the beginning of the twentieth century. Egypt was the first
country to deviate from the position of jamhur (the majority of Muslim Jurists) in 1929, when it provided
that a divorce accompanied by a number expressly or implied, shall count only as a single divorce and
such a divorce is revocable except when three talaqs are given, one in each tuhr.2 The Sudanese law of
1935 provides that pronouncement of all divorces by the husband is revocable except the third one,
along with a divorce before consummation of marriage, and a divorce for consideration.3 The Syrian
law of 1953 combined the provisions of the Egyptian and the Sudanese laws by providing that if a
divorce is coupled with a number, expressly or implied, not more than one divorce shall take place and
every divorce shall be revocable except a third divorce, a divorce before consummation, and a divorce
with consideration, and in this law such a divorce would be considered irrevocable.4 Morocco,5 Iraq,6
Jordan,7 Afghanistan,8 Libya,9 Kuwait,10 and Yemen,11 adopted similar laws in 1957/1958, 1959, 1976,
1977, 1984, 1984, and 1992, respectively. Besides these, many other Muslim countries have also
adopted Ibn Taimiyah’s opinion as the guideline for their personal laws on this topic. These include the
United Arab Emirates,12 Qatar13 and Bahrain being the latest countries, respectively, to embrace Ibn
1For a comprehensive treatment of the issue of triple talaq, see Muhammad Munir, Triple Talaq in One Session: An
Analysis of the Opinions of Classical, Medieval, and Modern Muslim Jurists, under Islamic law 27 Arab L. Q. 29–49 (2013)
[hereinafter Triple Talaq in One Session].
2See, Article 3 of Law No. 25 of 1929, as amended by Law No. 100 of 1985 Concerning Certain Provisions on Personal
Status in Egypt. Tuhr in Arabic means the period of “purity” between menstruations.
3Article 3, Shariah Circular No. 41/1935 of Sudan.
4Article 92 of Law No. 34 of the Law of Personal Status of Syria of 1953.
5Article 51 Book Two of the Mudawwana of 1957 and 1958 of Morocco.
6Article 37(2) of Law No. 188 of 1959: The Law of Personal Status of Iraq.
7Article 90 of Law No. 61 of 1976: The Law of Personal Status of Jordan.
8Sections 145 and 146 of the Civil Law of 4 January 1977 of Afghanistan.
9Section 33(d) of Law No. 10 of 1984, Concerning the Specific Provisions on Marriage and Divorce and their
Consequences.
10For Kuwaiti law, see section 109 of Law no. 51 of 1984 regarding “al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyah” (Personal Law),
, http://www.gcc-legal.org/MojPortalPublic/DisplayLegislations.aspx?country=1&LawTreeSectionID=1386 . (last
accessed Sept. 7, 2010).
11See, Article 64 of the Republican Decree Law No. 20 of 1992: Concerning Personal Status of Yemen.
12For the UAE, see, section 103(1) of Qanun al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiya (Personal Law) of UAE No. 28 of 2005,
, http://www.gcc-legal.org/MojPortalPublic/DisplayLegislations.aspx?country=2&LawTreeSectionID=6107 . (last
accessed Sept. 7, 2010).
13See, section 108 of the Qanun al-Usrah (Family Law) of Qatar, No. 22 of 2006, , http://www.gcc-legal.org/
MojPortalPublic/DisplayLegislations.aspx?country=2&LawTreeSectionID=6107 . (last accessed Sept. 7, 2010).
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Taimiyah’s views on triple talaq.14 To this list may be added Pakistan and Bangladesh. Section 7 of the
MFLO 1961, explained below, seems to have implied the abolishment of triple talaq because the
procedure contained therein is not applicable to it. Thus, fifteen Muslim states have either explicitly or
implicitly adopted Ibn Taimiyah’s position.
Tunisian law has gone one step further. Under Article 30 of the Tunisian Code of Personal Status,
1956, divorce pronounced outside a court of law will not have any validity whatsoever, and under
Article 32, no divorce shall be decreed except after the court has made an overall inquiry into the
causes of the rift and failed to bring about a reconciliation. In Algerian law “divorce may only be
established by a [court] judgment preceded by an attempt at reconciliation by the judge which shall not
exceed a period of three months.”15 Similarly, Sri Lanka’s Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Act, 1951, as
amended up to 2006, provides that a husband intending to divorce his wife “shall give notice of his
intention to the Qauzi [sic. Qadi ]” who shall attempt reconciliation between the spouses “with the help
of the relatives of the parties and of the elders and other influential Muslims of the area.” However, if
after thirty days of giving notice to the Qadi, attempts at reconciling the spouses remain fruitless, “the
husband, if he desires to proceed with the divorce, shall pronounce the talak [sic. talaq ] in the
presence of the Qadi and two witnesses.”16
Under the family law of the Malaysian state of Sarawak, a husband who desires to divorce his wife
has to request a court to look into the causes of proposed divorce and advise the husband not to
proceed with it. However, if the differences are irreconcilable, then the husband may pronounce one
divorce before the court.17 The procedure laid down in the laws of Algeria, Sri Lanka, and the Malaysian
state of Sarawak, seem to be in harmony with the procedure of talaq in Islamic law.
TALAQ AND THE MUSLIM FAMILY LAW ORDINANCE, 1961 IN PAKISTAN
The 1961 Muslim Family Law Ordinance is the most significant but also controversial reform law in
Pakistan. The same law was also inherited by Bangladesh. Background of the MFLO is rather interesting.
In 1955, Muhammad Ali Bogra, the then PrimeMinister of Pakistan, married his secretary while still legally
married to his first wife. Thereafter, the All Pakistan Women’s Association (APWA), an elitist women’s
organization, began an organized agitation throughout the country.18 On August 4, 1955, the government
of Pakistan announced the formation of a seven-member Commission on Marriage and Family Laws,
consisting of Dr Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din (President), Dr Khalifa Abdul Hakim (Member-Secretary), Maulana
Ehtesham-ul-Haq Thanvi, Mr Enayet-ur-Rahman, Begum Shahnawaz, Begum Anwar G. Ahmad, and
Begum Shamsunnahar Mahmood.19 After the demise of the incumbent president, Mian Abdur Rasheed,
a former Chief Justice of Pakistan, was appointed as its new president on October 27, 1955. The
commission was mandated to report on “the proper registration of marriages and divorces, the right to
divorce exercisable by either partner through a court or by other judicial means, maintenance and the
establishment of special courts to deal expeditiously with cases affecting women’s rights.”20 The
commission published its report on June 20, 1956, while the dissenting note of Maulana Thanvi was
published separately on August 30, 1956. The commission’s report invited severe criticism from the
‘ulama.21 A detailed discussion of the commission’s report is beyond the scope of this work.22
14See, section 88(C) of Law No. 19 of 2009 regarding Qanun Ahkam al-Usrah, ,http://www.gcc-legal.org/
MojPortalPublic/DisplayLegislations.aspx?country=6&LawTreeSectionID=9968 . (last accessed Sept. 7, 2010).
15See Article 49 of Law No. 84-II of 9 June 1984, Comprising the Family Law of Algeria.
16See Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Act, 1951 as amended till 2006 [Cap. 134] section 27 and Rules 1 & 2 Second
Schedule. However, the law does not mention whether talaq pronounced by a husband without following this procedure is
valid or not. Serajuddin wrongly mentions that three notices should be given by a husband to the wife under section 27 of
the above law. See Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, Shari‘a Law and Society: Tradition and Change in South Asia 222 (2d
ed., Karachi: Oxford University Press 2001).
17See sections 43 and 45(1–4) of Ordinan 43 Tahun 2001, Ordinan Undang-Undang Keluarga Islam, 2001, Negeri,
Sarawak. There is a similar procedure for talaq in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia); See also, Zaleha
Kamruddin, Divorce Laws in Malaysia (Civil & Shariah)167–168 (Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University, 1998).
18See Freeland Abbott, Pakistan’s New Marriage Law: A Reflection of Qur’anic Interpretation 1 Asian Survey 26, 26
( Jan. 1962); See also Pakistan Times, Lahore (Apr. 14, 1955).
19Report of the Commission on Marriages and Family Laws, The Gazette of Pakistan, Karachi 1197, ( June 20, 1956)
[hereafter Report].
20Id. at 1197–8.
21For example, see generally Syed Abul A‘la Maududi, The Family Law of Islam, in Studies in the Family Law of Islam 21
(Khurshid Ahmad ed., 2d ed., Karachi 1961); Amin Ahsan Islahi, A Critique of the Modernist Approach to the Family Law of
Islam, in Id. at 194.
22For a detailed analysis of the Report, see Serajuddin, supra n. 16, at 35–75.
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The commission recommended the enactment of laws providing that three divorces in one session
would amount to one pronouncement, and for a divorce to be effective, two further pronouncements in
two successive tuhrs would be necessary.23 Moreover, they added that the legislation should provide
that no person would be able to pronounce a divorce without obtaining an order to that effect from a
matrimonial and family court.24
Moulana Thanavi rejected outright the commission’s recommendations, by stating that, “[t]o put a
restriction on the exercise of this right by making it ineffective if talaq is not registered or not authorized
by the Matrimonial and Family Laws Court, not only amounts to tampering with the injunctions of the
faith but also putting obstacles in the way of dissolution even when it becomes necessary and
desirable.”25
Because of the intense hostility of the ‘ulama to the commission’s recommendations relating to
divorce, the framers of the MFLO ignored the idea of court intervention in divorce. The provisions of
section 7 of the MFLO relating to talaq are reproduced herein below:
1. Any man who wishes to divorce his wife shall, as soon as may be after the pronouncement of talaq
in any form whatsoever, give the Chairman notice in writing of his having done so, and shall supply
a copy thereof to the wife.
2. Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be punishable with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to five
thousand rupees or both.
3. Save as provided in sub-section (5), a talaq unless revoked earlier, expressly or otherwise, shall not
be effective until the expiration of ninety days from the day on which notice under sub-section (1) is
delivered to the Chairman.
4. Within thirty days of the receipt of notice under sub-section (1), the Chairman shall constitute an
Arbitration Council for the purpose of bringing about the reconciliation between the parties, and the
Arbitration Council shall take all steps necessary to bring about such reconciliation.
5. If the wife be pregnant at the time talaq is pronounced, talaq shall not be effective until the period
mentioned in sub-section (3) or the pregnancy, whichever be later, ends.
6. Nothing shall debar a wife whose marriage has been terminated by talaq effective under this
section from marrying the same husband, without an intervening marriage with a third person,
unless such termination is for the third time, so effective.
The most manifest implications of section 7 are: First, it refers the issue of divorce to an administrative
body for bringing about a reconciliation; second, talaq is not effective for ninety days, during which
reconciliation shall be attempted between the parties. Unfortunately, the reconciliation effort does not
precede the pronouncement of talaq, but follows it. Third, although subsection (1) mentions any form of
talaq (“talaq in any form whatsoever”) which in turn, obviously includes ihsan,26 hasan,27 as well as
talaq al-bid‘at (triple talaq). But under Islamic law, as discussed above, the procedure for reconciliation
is only possible if only either one or two—and not the third one—pronouncements have been made.28
Fourthly, section 7 can be construed to imply abolishment of talaq al-bid‘at because it allows
remarriage between the two parties after the divorce without an intervening marriage or halala, which,
under section 7, becomes imperative following the third such pronouncement.
23Report, supra n. 19, at 1213.
24Id. at 1214.
25Id. at 1586–7.
26In the ihsan form, the husband pronounces only one talaq while his wife is in a state of purity during which time he has
not had sexual intercourse with her and does not revoke it until the end of the third purity.
27In the h
_
asan form, the husband pronounces one talaq in a tuhr, he must not pronounce talaq for a second time until
the next tuhr. He can do so still later at anytime during the subsistence of the marriage, say after three years, and whenever
he does so, the talaq will be counted as the second talaq. When the husband has pronounced talaq for the second time in
a tuhr, he must not pronounce talaq for a third time before the next tuhr, but he can do so still later at anytime during the
subsistence of the marriage and whenever he does so, the pronouncement will be counted as the third talaq. For details,
see Triple Talaq in One Session, supra n. 1.
28This is according to the jamhur. Reconciliation is possible according to Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn al-Qayyim, the ahl al-hadith,
and the Shi‘a Imamiya, because they treat three repudiations in one session to be one.
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The MFLO is indeed a very vague piece of legislation as far as its provisions of talaq and share of
the grandchild29 are concerned. The ‘ulama launched a scathing attack on these provisions in
particular.30 The main criticism of section 7 is as follows: First, under Islamic law, a third divorce
becomes effective as soon as it is pronounced but under section 7, a third divorce will be effective
only after ninety days have elapsed from the date of the receipt of its notice by the chairman, and
not from the date of pronouncement of the talaq. Secondly, under Islamic law, ‘iddat (waiting
period) is counted from the time of the pronouncement but, under section 7 it is counted from the
time the notice is received by the chairman. Furthermore, problems arise when no notice is sent to
the chairman. Thirdly, under Islamic law, divorce of a couple who have not yet consummated their
marriage becomes effective immediately and no ‘iddat is required for the woman. But, under the
MFLO, every divorce, whether or not the marriage is consummated, will be effective only after the
expiry of ninety days following the receipt of its notice, by the chairman.31 Fourthly, according to
section 7, the ‘iddat of a woman who is not pregnant is over ninety days but under Islamic law, her
‘iddat is three monthly courses. Fifthly, under section 7, the ‘iddat of a pregnant woman is the end
of pregnancy or ninety days, whichever is later. According to the Qur’an, it ends with the end of
pregnancy, a period which may be less than ninety days. Finally, under section 7, effectiveness of
talaq is dependent on the notice of talaq to the chairman and reconciliatory efforts by him. This
has no basis in Islamic law.
In Allah Rakha v. The Federation of Pakistan,32 the Federal Shariat Court in Pakistan had declared
subsections (3) and (5) of section 7, as repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.33 The federal government
had appealed against that decision to the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court where the
case is pending at the writing of this work.
Section 7 of the MFLO has been the subject of fierce debates in the academic circles as well as
amongst the superior judiciary in Pakistan. It is pointed out by some authors that because of the
procedure laid down in section 7, Pakistani law abolishes triple talaq or talaq al-bid‘at,34 in one
session, which seems to be the correct view.
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 7 OF THE MFLO
The first question awaiting interpretation by the judiciary in Pakistan concerned the consequences of
failure to give notice of talaq to the chairman (i.e., what might be the effect(s) of a husband’s failure to
give any notice of talaq to the chairman?). In Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Yusuf,35 the
Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the husband did not give notice of talaq to the chairman, he
29Section 4 of the MFLO states that “In the event of the death of any son or daughter of the propositus before opening of
succession, the children of such son or daughter, if any, living at the time the succession opens, shall per stirpes receive a
share equivalent to the share which such son or daughter, as the case may be, would have received if alive.” This section
has been severely criticized by ‘ulama, many modernists, and some foreign authors. Those who defended this section
include Fazlur Rahman, Moulvi Muhammad Usmani, Kemal Farooqi, and N. J. Coulson. Those who opposed representation
for an orphaned grandchild include Tanzil-ur-Rahman, F.M. Kullay, Herbert J. Liebesny, and J.N.D. Anderson, to name a few.
For a comprehensive discussion of the views, arguments, and analysis of the supporters and opponents of section 4, see
Serajuddin, supra n. 16, at 81–118, and Hamid Khan, Islamic Law of Inheritance 168–184 (2d ed., Karachi: Pakistan Law
House); The Federal Shariat Court in Allah Rakha v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2000 FSC 1 has declared section 4 of the
MFLO to be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and the case has been appealed to the Shariat Appellate Bench of the
Supreme Court, where it is pending.
30Muslim Family Laws Ordinance as Commented Upon by Ulama in the Light of [the] Quran [sic] and [the] Sunnah
(Hyderabad: Maktaba-e-Ilmi). The original pamphlet was in Urdu and was signed by fourteen ‘ulama, mostly from Lahore;
Marriage Commission Report X-Rayed (Khurshid Ahmad, ed., Karachi: Chirag-i-Rah Pub. 1959) (second ed. titled Studies in
the Family Law of Islam).
31In practice, the Arbitration Council locally known as “Musalihati Council” (in some areas it is known as the “Musalihati
Court”), upon the receipt of the notice, looks at the type of talaq pronounced by the husband. The council does not act
when three pronouncements are made by a husband, and tells the parties to wait for ninety days for obtaining their divorce
certificates. Thus, in practice, the chairmen of the council considers three talaqs in one session, as three.
32PLD 2000 FSC 1.
33Id. at 62. Under Article 203D(1) of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, the Injunctions of Islam mean whether a provision
of law is according to the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH), or not. Thus, the Federal Shariat Court has the
constitutional duty to “examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the
injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet.” In other words, the court has no
duty to look to other sources of Islamic law, beyond the Qur’an and the Sunnah, to decide the Islamicity of a legal
provision.
34See Serajuddin, supra n. 16, at 215; Lucy Carroll, Talaq-e-Tafwid in the Classical Texts, in Carroll & Kapoor, Talaq-e-
Tafwid, 45.
35PLD 1963 SC 51.
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would be deemed to have revoked the talaq.36 The facts of this case are very interesting. In 1951 Ali
Nawaz Gardezi, a Shi‘a Muslim from Pakistan, married a German woman, Christa Renate Sonntag in
Hull, England, and subsequently, the couple moved to Lahore and settled there. In August 1961, Renate
met Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf at Quetta and they developed a liking for each other. On December 31,
1961, Renate and Yusuf left Lahore for Quetta and on January 2,1962, they were married there according
to Islamic rites. Renate was declared to have converted to Islam and took the new name Ruqayya.
Gardezi filed a complaint under sections 497 and 498 of the Pakistan Penal Code against Yusuf for
enticing his wife and committing adultery with her. Yusuf was found guilty on both charges by a single
bench of the West Pakistan High Court and fined 12,500 rupees and 7,500 rupees, respectively, on each
charge, or in default, to suffer imprisonment for one year on the first charge and up to six months on the
second charge. On his intra-court appeal, the full bench of the High Court acquitted him of both the
charges and accepted his appeal. However, Gardezi appealed to the Supreme Court because the case
involved many questions of law.
Yusuf’s main defense was that Gardezi had properly divorced Renate and produced before the court
an alleged divorce deed signed by Gardezi on December 29, 1961. Gardezi challenged the divorce
deed. The trial judge held that the deed was forged but the appellate bench had considered it genuine.
The Supreme Court left the issue of the genuineness of the deed unresolved. The alleged divorce deed
was open to a number of objections. First, the court held that Renate’s assertion that she had become a
Muslim was not supported by any evidence as there were neither witnesses nor a maulvi (religious
scholar) present on the occasion of her declaration of adoption of Islam as her new religion. The court
further said that, “There is then no escape from the conclusion that, on her own showing, Christa
Renate had not been properly divorced by the complainant, as she was not a Muslim on the
relevant date.”37
Secondly, the divorce alleged to have been pronounced by Gardezi could at best be described as
talaq-i-bid‘at (triple divorce) but since he was a Shi‘a Muslim such a talaq was not recognized as valid
under Shi‘a law. Under the Shi‘a law, a husband cannot make his talaq to his wife irrevocable.
Moreover, the Shi‘a law requires the presence of two witnesses and the exchange of specific words
(sega) for talaq. As discussed above, under the Shi‘a law, which incidentally is also concurred by Ibn
Taimiyah, even three pronouncements of talaq in one session amount to a single pronouncement only.
Thirdly, Gardezi’s counsel argued that the MFLO would be applicable only where both parties to a
marriage were Muslim citizens of Pakistan. The court maintained that the ordinance was applicable to
those situations as well where only the husband was a Muslim citizen. The court then ventured to
discuss the purposes and objectives of section 7 of the ordinance and the implications of non-
compliance with it. The court said
The section clearly contemplates a machinery of conciliation whereby a husband wishing to
divorce his wife unilaterally, may be enabled to think better of it, if the mediation of others can
resolve the differences between the spouses. The talaq pronounced is to be ineffective for
90 days from the date on which notice under subsection (1) of this section is delivered to the
Chairman and this period is to be utilized for the attempt at reconciliation . . . the object of
section 7 is to prevent hasty dissolution of marriages by talaq, pronounced by the husband,
unilaterally, without an attempt being made to prevent disruption of the matrimonial status. If
the husband himself thinks better of the pronouncement of talaq and abstains from giving a
notice to the Chairman, he should perhaps be deemed, in view of section 7, to have revoked
the pronouncement and that would be to the advantage of the wife. Subsection (3) of this
section precludes the talaq from being effective as such, for a certain period and within that
period, consequently, it could not be said that the marital status of the parties had in any way
changed. They would still in law continue to be husband and wife.38
These remarks by Justice S.A. Rahman do not make any reference to Islamic law. His clear ruling above
shows that he considered section 7 of the MFLO to have abolished triple talaq in one session and that
any talaq under this section is not irrevocable. Moreover, according to his interpretation, the marital
status of the parties does not change within the 90-day period provided for in subsection (3). The most
controversial interpretation of Justice Rahman, however, is that failure to give notice of talaq to the
chairman under subsection (3) amounts to revocation of talaq. Although this interpretation has
36Id. at 74–75 (per Justice S.A. Rahman).
37Id. at 72.
38Id. at 74–75.
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benefited women who ask the courts for maintenance when their husbands pronounce talaq orally
without giving any notice of it to the chairman, however, this has caused trouble for some women upon
remarrying, as ex-husbands can very well accuse them of adultery.
The court ruled that the marriage between Renate and Gardezi subsisted because even if she was
divorced, no notice of it had been given to the chairman. Thus Yusuf had committed adultery with
Renate but the court acquitted him under section 497 of the Pakistan Penal Code on the ground that
Gardezi had manipulated the details. Gardezi knew that adultery was being committed but took no
steps to prevent it. Yusuf was, however, found guilty of enticing and taking away Renate from Lahore,
for which the court fined him the reduced amount of 2000 rupees.
The overall effect of the Gardezi case was that notice to the chairman of the concerned Union Council
was mandatory upon pronouncement of talaq by a husband and failure to give notice of talaq under
section 7 amounted to its revocation. This remark by S.A. Rahman, J. could only be considered as
dictum because failure to give notice of talaq was not an issue in that case. This indeed was a very
controversial interpretation of section 7. However, the Supreme Court as well as the High Court raised it
to the status of a celebrated ratio in subsequent cases, such as the State v. Mst. Tauqir Fatima,39 Abdul
Aziz v. Rezia Khatoon,40 Abdul Mannan v. Safrun Nessa,41 Mst. Ghulam Fatima v. Abdul Qayyum and
Others,42 Muhammad Salahuddin Khan v. Muhammad Nazir Siddiqui,43 and Junaid Ali v. Abdul
Qadir.44 The Gardezi case had thus become “the Gardezi rule”—failure to give notice of talaq amounts
to its revocation.
There have been only two exceptions to “the Gardezi rule” reported in two later cases, but these were
due to the peculiar circumstances of those two cases. These were Noor Khan v. Haq Nawaz,45 and
Chuhar v. Ghulam Fatima.46 In the Noor Khan case, in November 1979, Noor Khan filed a First
Information Report (FIR) in a police station alleging that about ten years prior to that, a certain Haq
Nawaz had forcibly taken his uncle’s wife Naziran Bibi away, and ever since had been committing zina
(adultery) with her and she had also given birth to three children. Fateh Khan, the ex-husband, claimed
that he had not divorced Naziran Bibi whereas Haq Nawaz and Naziran Bibi asserted that they were
legally married after Fateh Khan had divorced her. The case was tried under the offences of the Zina
Ordinance, 1979 and subsequently it reached the Federal Shariat Court. The court held the following:
In the particular circumstances of the case before us, we are of the view that the version of the
defence in respect of the divorce having been pronounced by Fateh Khan, P. W. appears to be
more plausible in view of the long acquiescence of 10/12 years by the complainant party in
allowing the two accused to continue to live as husband and wife without any challenge or
prosecution whatsoever. In these circumstances it would be making the technicality of the
provisions of notice under section 7 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance too cumbersome on
the parties who have been living together as husband and wife without any challenge for 10/12
years. They were all the time thinking that they had been validly married after divorce by P.W.
Fateh Khan and inaction of Fateh Khan had reinforced their belief. Such a state of affairs could
not be held to be covered by the provisions of definition of Zina as provided in section 4 of
Ordinance VII of 1979.47
The court came to the conclusion that the complainant was motivated by revenge and feelings of
loss of face.
In Chuhar v. Ghulam Fatima,48 Boota had divorced Ghulam Fatima but had not sent the notice of
talaq to the chairman of the Union Council, as required. Ghulam Fatima married Muhammad Ramzan,
and a son, Fakir Hussain, was born of this wedlock. After Ramzan’s death, his cousin, Chuhar, filed a
suit in January 1976 claiming the deceased Ramzan’s estate as his sole heir. He alleged that his cousin,
Ramzan, was not legally married to Ghulam Fatima since her divorce from the first husband was
ineffective under section 7 of the MFLO because he had not sent any notice of talaq to the Council’s
chairman, although the first husband asserted before the court that he had not revoked the talaq. The
39PLD 1964 (W.P.) Kar. 306.
4021 DLR 1969, 733.
411970 SCMR 845.
42PLD 1981 SC 460.
431984 SCMR 583.
441987 SCMR 518.
45PLD 1982 FSC 265.
46PLD 1984 Lah. 234.
47Noor Khan v. Haq Nawaz, PLD 1982 FSC 265 at 275–6.
48PLD 1984 Lah. 234.
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court held that failure to give notice of talaqmight give rise to an irresistible presumption that the talaq
has been revoked impliedly but the presumption is rebuttable and that each case should be decided
on its own facts. In the present case, the talaq was pronounced some fifteen to eighteen years earlier,
and the first husband never revoked it expressly or impliedly. The court ruled that section 7 of the
ordinance was meant for the benefit of women and it should not be interpreted in a manner which
might ruin their lives. On the facts of the case, the court held that not giving a notice did not render the
talaq ineffective. Chuhar v. Ghulam Fatima was relied upon by a division bench of the high court
division of the Bangldesh Supreme Court in Sirajul Islam v. Helana Begum.49 Noor Khan and Chuhar
are the two main exceptions to the infamous ‘Gardezi rule’, otherwise the repeated pronouncements by
the judiciary has raised that case to the status of a ‘well-settled principle of law’.
Till the passing of the Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 (hereinafter the
Protection of Women Act), husbands who would not comply with subsection (3) of section 7 to give
notice of talaq would, in order to harass their ex-wives, accuse them of zina with their new husbands.
The Protection of Women Act has put an end to this practice.50
In Mst. Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Muhammad,51 the Supreme Court of Pakistan, while discussing the
Gardezi rule, held that “failure to send notice of talaq to the Chairman of the Union Council does not by
itself lead to the conclusion that talaq has been revoked. It may only be ineffective but not revoked”52
[italics supplied]. This was the first time that the infamous Gardezi rule was overruled by the Supreme
Court itself. In the Kaneez Fatima case, both the husband and wife had mutually agreed to dissolve
their marriage with effect from 1st November 1977, and the wife received 10,000 rupees and five tolas
(one tola equals twelve grams) of gold in lieu of the prompt dower of 30,000 rupees and 20 tolas of
gold and a monthly maintenance of 200 rupees as part of the settlement. Both parties had agreed that
they would have no further claim in the future against each other. However, on 6th April 1978, the
appellant Kaneez Fatima filed a suit for recovery of what she claimed was the remaining amount of the
dower (i.e., 20,000 rupees) and maintenance, in the family court, pleading that the compromise was
arrived at due to coercion and no notice of dissolution of marriage had ever been given to the chairman
as provided for in section 7 of the MFLO, 1961. It was held that “In case where with the consent of both
the parties divorce is effected and confirmed in writing under their undisputed signatures section 7
should not be strictly construed.” The court opined that “the notice can be sent at any time thereafter to
comply with the provisions of section 7.”53 In stating so, the court refused maintenance to the
appellant. Commenting on the Gardezi rule, the court held, “So far the observations made in Syed Ali
Nawaz Gardezi’s case, it may be observed that failure to send notice of talaq to the Chairman of the
Union Council does not by itself lead to the conclusion that talaq has been revoked. It may only be
ineffective but not revoked.”54
Unfortunately, in Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court,55 the Supreme Court took another U-turn and
upheld the controversial Gardezi rule (without referring to the Gardezi case itself).56 In the Farah Naz
case, the appellant filed a suit for recovery of maintenance from the husband on February 16, 2002, but
the husband, who claimed to have pronounced divorce from her on December 13, 1997, stated that she
was not entitled to the relief of maintenance. Her claim for past maintenance was rejected by the trial
court, but accepted by the first appellate court from December 28, 1996 to April 14, 1998. Both courts
49In this case the husband had divorced his wife but did not give any notice of talaq to the chairman of the concerned
Union Council or to his wife. Regarding the payment of the wife’s deferred dower, the husband’s counsel argued that since
the husband had not given any notice of talaq to the chairman under section 7, the talaq pronounced by him was not
effective and the wife was thereby not entitled to the deferred dower. The wife’s counsel rebutted this argument and
contended that swearing the affidavit and registration of the talaq showed that the husband definitely intended to sever
the marriage tie with his wife and not to revoke it again. The court held that non-service of notice to the chairman of the
Union Council under section 7 of the MFLO cannot render the divorce ineffective if the conduct of the husband appears to
be so. 48 DLR (1996). The court held that the divorce was valid and effective and the wife was entitled to decree for the
entire amount of her deferred dower. Id. at 51.
50For details, see this author’s Is Zina bil jabr a hadd, ta‘zir, or Syasa offence? A Re-Appraisal of the Protection of Women
Act, 2006 in Pakistan, 14 Y.B. Islamic & Middle E. L. 95–115 (2008–2009).
51PLD 1993 SC 901.
52Id at 916. (Per Saleem Akhtar, J for the five members bench. Other members of the bench were Shafiur Rahman, Abdul
Qadeer Chaudhry, Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Wali Muhammad Khan, JJ).
53See PLD 1993 SC 901 at 917.
54See PLD 1993 SC 901 at 915–6.
55PLD 2006, SC 457.
56See id. at 463 (per Rana Bhagwandas, J for the divisional bench).
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(i.e. trial court and the first appellate court) accepted the oral talaq pronounced by the husband
although the husband had not given any notice of that talaq to the chairman as required under
section 7. The High Court upheld the decision of the trial court regarding maintenance. However, the
Supreme Court disagreed and held that “oral allegation of talaq would neither be effective nor valid
and binding on the appellant.” The Farah Naz case was decided by a divisional bench of the Supreme
Court comprising of Rana Bhagwandas and Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi, J.J., whereas Kaneez Fatima was
decided by a larger bench of five judges. Although facts in both the cases were somewhat similar, in the
Farah Naz case the court awarded the wife past maintenance as claimed by her.
In Farah Naz, the Supreme Court made no reference to either Ali Nawaz Gardezi or to Kaneez Fatima. This
author’s conclusion is that in Kaneez Fatima the parties opted out of the procedure of section 7 whereas
there was no mutual compromise to put an end to the marital tie and the husband allegedly pronounced
an oral talaq but had failed to prove it. Another point is that in Farah Naz the respondent (husband) was
trying to benefit from his own failure to give notice of talaq to the chairman. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court did not raise this point in its discussion. The Farah Naz decision has apparently re-activated the
“Gardezi rule” (i.e., failure to give notice of talaq to the chairman amounts to revocation). In addition,
Farah Naz (a divisional bench’s decision) cannot overrule Kaneez Fatima (a unanimous decision by a
five-member bench) because a larger bench of the Supreme Court binds a smaller bench.57
The preceding discussion is thus clearly depictive of the Supreme Court’s inconsistency with regard to
section 7 of the MFLO. Moreover, as we have seen above, from the perspective of Islamic law, there exist
many objections against section 7. In addition, the penalty clause of section 7 (i.e., subsection 7(2)) is
useless, as there has not been any case reported in Pakistan under this subsection. Thismeans that there is
no punishment when a husband violates section 7 in divorcing his wife. The problem is that a divorceemay
have no interest to go to court against an ex-husband if they are not divorced under section 7, as most
women would consider themselves divorced under Islamic Law. One solution may be that in cases where
the Chairman of the Union Council (also known as the Thalthi Council or theMusalihati Council) is aware
that a husband has violated section 7, he should report such cases to the police for action. Otherwise,
subsection 2 will have no effect and thus remain a toothless law.
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE MFLO IN BANGLADESH
Bangladesh, the former East Pakistan, inherited the MFLO, 1961 before gaining its independence in
1971. The view that the sending of notice under section 7(1) is not essential seems to have emerged in
Bangladesh in Abdul Aziz v. RaziaKhatoon,58 which was relied upon later by the then erstwhile Lahore
High Court in Maqbool Jan v. Arshad Hassan.,59 in which the court observed the following:
I am also in respectful agreement with the specific observation in the Dacca [High Court] case of
Abdul Aziz that if talaq is otherwise valid (i.e., under the personal law of the parties the talaq is
valid) it would become effective under that law; but the only clog therein is that its effectiveness
would be postponed for ninety days under subsection (3) of section 7 of the Ordinance.60
In other words, the court indicated that failure to give notice of talaq is just a formality and that talaq will
be effective after ninety days.61 However, the decision is ambiguous and should be read with caution.62
Under section 7(4), it is obligatory on the chairman to constitute an arbitration council for bringing
about a reconciliation between the parties. However, the effects of the failure of the chairman to
constitute the council, the council’s failure to attempt reconciliation, or the failure of either of the
affected parties to participate in the proceedings of the council are unclear since 7(4) is silent on these
issues. In Abdul Aziz v. Rezia Khatoon,63 it was argued on behalf of the wife that unless an arbitration
council was duly constituted and the council failed to bring about reconciliation between the parties, a
57For details of this rule, see, this author’s forthcoming Precedent in Pakistani Law (Karachi: Oxford U. Press, 2013).
58[1969] DLC 586.
59PLD 1975 Lah. 147.
60Id. at 151–2 (per Afzal Zullah J). The quote of this case given in Anisur Rahman, Development of Muslim Family Law in
Bangladesh: Empowerment or Streamlining of Women? 51 J. Asiatic Soc’y (2008) is wrong.
http://www.asiaticsociety.org.bd/journals/Dec_2008/contents/AnisurRahman.htm (last accessed Oct. 6, 2012).
61The decision is not very clear because on the one hand it seems to validate talaq if valid under the personal law of the
parties, and on the other hand, it mentions that talaq will be effective subject to subsection (3) of section 7. Section 7(3)
talks about the delivery of notice to the Chairman of the Union Council.
62See David Pearl & Werner Menski,Muslim Personal Law 379 (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1998). David & Menski’s work
is now fourteen-years-old and its new and updated edition is long overdue.
6321 DLR (1969) 733.
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divorce could not be legally effective under section 7 of the ordinance. The court held that if the
chairman fails to constitute an arbitration council or, even after its constitution, the council fails to take
necessary steps for bringing about a reconciliation, the talaq, if valid otherwise, will be effective on the
expiry of ninety days from the date of receipt of the notice of talaq by the Chairman of the Union
Council.64
In Abdus Sobhan v. Md. Abdul Ghani,65 the respondent accused Sakhitannessa, his wife, of bigamy.
He alleged that she was legally married to him and that Abdus Sobhan Sarkar married her during
the subsistence of this marriage. Abdus Sobhan’s counsel argued that his client had married
Sakhitannessa after she exercised her delegated right to divorce66 and that the arbitration council had
approved the divorce. The court held that nothing is mentioned in section 7 as to what will happen if
the chairman does not constitute an arbitration council or if the council fails to take the necessary
steps. The court, therefore, observed the following:
Once written notice of the pronouncement of a talaq in terms of sub-section (1) is delivered to
the Chairman, the talaq, if otherwise valid, will be effective on the expiry of ninety days of the
delivery of such notice . . . . Thus, so far as talaqs concerned the Arbitration Council has no
function except to take steps to bring about reconciliation between the parties. Between this
the Arbitration Council has nothing to do in this matter.67
Unfortunately, the same year in which the Abdus Sobhan case was decided, 1973, the high court
division inMd. Kutubuddin Jaigirdar v. Nurjahan Begum,68 ruled that sending a notice to the chairman
and the opposite party is [a] pre-requisite to the legal validity of a divorce. This position seems to have
been settled since Sirajul Islam v. Helana Begum.69 In that case, no notice of talaq was given by the
husband to either the chairman of the concerned Union Council or the wife. In connection with payment
of the wife’s deferred dower, a question arose whether the talaq was effective. The husband’s counsel
argued that since no notice was served by the husband, the talaq pronounced by him had not become
effective and the wife was not entitled to the deferred dower. However, the husband had sworn in an
affidavit before the magistrate pronouncing talaq and had served a copy of the affidavit upon the Nikah
Registrar under section 6 of the Muslim Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Act, 1974. The court held
that “mere non-service of notice upon the Chairman of the Union Council under section 7 of the Muslim
Family Law Ordinance cannot render the divorce ineffective if the conduct of the husband appears
to be so.”70 The court relied on Pakistani cases Chuhar v. Ghulam Fatima (discussed above), and
Mrs. Parveen Chaudhry v. 6th Senior Civil Judge, Karachi,71 and held that the divorce was valid and
effective and the wife was entitled to the entire amount of dower. Since the above were all high court
decisions in Bangladesh, they have clarified the position that in Bangladesh, a failure to give notice of
talaq to the Chairman of the Union Council does not invalidate talaq if the conduct of the husband
indicated that he had indeed divorced his wife. The Bangladeshi case law is also very good in
answering the question about the failure of the chairman to constitute an arbitration council as well as
the failure of the council to take the necessary steps.
TRIPLE TALAQ AND THE INDIAN CASE LAW
In light of the verdicts given by some Indian High Courts, talaq al-bid‘at (as it is spelled in India) is both
invalid and ineffective if pronounced by the husband. In Marium v. Md. Shamsi Alam,72 the husband
had pronounced triple talaq on his wife and when he repented his action, she filed a suit for a
declaration that she had been divorced by Alam. The Allahabad High Court held that “[a] divorce
pronounced thrice in one breath by a Muslim husband would have no effect in law, if it was given
without deliberation and without any intention of affecting an irrevocable divorce; such divorce is a
64Id. at 736.
6525 DLR (1973) 227.
66For details of delegated right of divorce also known as “talaq-i-tafwid”, see this author’s Stipulations in a Muslim
Marriage Contract with Special Reference to Talaq al-Tafwid Provisions in Pakistani Law 12 Y.B. Islamic & Middle E. L. 235–
262 (2005–2006).
67Id., at 229.
6825 DLR (1973) 21.
6948 DLR (1996) 48.
70Id. at 51.
71PLD 1976 Kar. 416.
72AIR 1979 All. 257.
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form of talq-e-ahsan, and thus is revocable by the husband before the iddat expires.” The court ruled
that talaq pronounced by Alam was revoked by him within the iddat period. Therefore, the marriage
between the couple was subsisting and the wife was denied the relief she had asked for. The Allahabad
High Court, thus, had based its decision on the opinion of Ibn Taimiyah, which in the subcontinent, is
endorsed by the Ahl al-hadith.
In Rahmat Ullah v. State of U.P.,73 the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court declared the triple
talaq invalid. In this case, a notice was issued to Rahmat Ullah, a landowner, under the U.P. Imposition
of Ceiling on Land Holding (Amendment) Act, 1972. He pleaded that since he had divorced his wife
Khatoon Nisa, the land belonging to her was mistakenly added to his assets. Both Khatoon Nisa and
Rahmat Ullah produced a document to prove the divorce. Under the Act, a married woman cannot hold
separate property; but a judicially separated wife or a divorcee can. The High Court had to decide
whether the plea of divorce was genuine or resorted to for defrauding the state, and whether a woman
who is divorced according to the rules of her personal law is entitled to the same benefits as a woman
who is separated or divorced through a court decree. The court ruled that the mode of triple divorce,
giving unbridled power to the husband to divorce his wife at will, cannot be deemed operative as it has
the effect of perpetuating discrimination on the grounds of gender, i.e., male authoritarianism. The
court further opined that since the practice of triple talaq denigrates women, it is in violation of the
Indian Constitution.
This decision is very strange because it declared a marriage dissolved twenty-five years earlier to be
subsisting even against the wishes of the parties. Moreover, the issue of triple talaq was not an issue
before the court and the opinion of the court on this point could be treated only as obiter dicta.74 Also,
it is against Article 26 of the Constitution, which protects the personal law of each religious community
in India; and, the court’s interpretation of Islamic law is seriously flawed because it did not discuss the
opinions of Muslim jurists on the issue. Finally, being a matter of personal law, the court should have
avoided the imposition of Ibn Taimiyah’s opinion, if the parties concerned wanted to be governed by
the opinions of the Hanafi fuqha. The court had, in fact, attempted to force a reunion between the
ex-husband and his divorced wife without the free consent of either.
InMasroor Ahmed v. State,75 the husband claimed restitution of conjugal rights against the wife who
in turn filed proceedings for dowry harassment. While these cases were pending in the court, the
couple decided to be reunited. However, since the estranged husband had, reportedly, triply divorced
his wife, the local ‘ulama (religious scholars) opined that the reunion was illegal and sexual relations
resumed by the two amounted to zina. To circumvent this, the husband entered into a new contract of
marriage with the wife. But, the ‘ulama insisted that renewal of marriage, without an intervening
marriage (halala) with a third person, was of no avail and their zina verdict remained in force.
Meanwhile, relations between the husband and the wife worsened and the wife filed a First Information
Report against the husband accusing him of marital rape. They subsequently reconciled and the
husband applied to the court for quashment of the FIR. Badar Durrez Ahmad, J., of Delhi High Court
observed that harsh abruptness of triple talaq has brought about extreme misery to divorced women
and even men who are left with no choice to undo the wrong or any scope to bring about reconciliation.
He ruled that a triple talaq should be regarded as one revocable talaq.
Another novel Indian concept regarding triple talaq is that talaq must be “for a reasonable cause.”
This was first held in Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begum76 by the Gauhati High Court. Two other grounds
were also added by the court. These were that talaq must be preceded by “attempts at reconciliation”
by the nominees of the spouses, and it “may be affected” if the said attempts fail.77 In this case, the
wife was thrown out of her matrimonial home by her husband and she applied for maintenance. The
husband argued that he had divorced her. The first question that the court had to answer was whether
there had been a valid talaq by the husband. The court held that the talaq allegedly given by the
husband was invalid under Islamic law and the wife was entitled to maintenance. Jiauddin was a single
73Writ Petition No. 45 of 1993.
74Also see Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of Women’s Rights in IndiaWomen & L. in India 112–16
(2004); Furqan Ahmad, Triple Talaq: An Analytical Study with Emphasis on Socio-Legal Aspects 105–08 (New Delhi 1994).
75See details of the case in Tahir Mahmud, A Revolutionary Judgment on Divorce: Comments on a Recent Delhi High
Court Decision, 12 Amity L. Watch: H. J. of Amity Inst. of Adv. Leg. Stud, 9–10 (Nov. 2007).
76(1981) 1 GLR 358.
77Attempt at reconciliation before talaq is undoubtedly Islamic but is not a pre-condition for talaq to be effective.
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bench decision but was subsequently endorsed by many Indian High Courts,78 as well as the Supreme
Court.79 The prevailing case law in India, therefore, is that talaq given without a valid cause, which is
not preceded by an attempt at reconciliation between the nominees of the spouses, is invalid.
However, such reforms should be brought by legislators and not through judicial law-making or judicial
activism. The Indian courts have attempted a rewriting of Islamic law unknown to the overwhelming
majority of Muslim jurists.
CONCLUSION
The MFLO, 1961, has abolished triple talaq as the procedure laid down in section 7 is largely applicable
to one or two pronouncements. Furthermore, some subsections of section 7 are in clear contravention
of Islamic law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has also not been consistent in its interpretation of
section 7, especially in the matter concerning failure to give notice of talaq to the Chairman of the Union
Council. Courts in Bangladesh have also been inconsistent about the issue of non-service of the notice
of talaq. Likewise, some Indian High Courts have ruled that talaq-e bid‘i or talaq-e-bid‘at is not valid if
exercised by a husband. Moreover, Indian courts have held that talaq without a “just cause,” which is
not preceded by an “attempt at reconciliation” between the spouses, is invalid. Such rulings are very
controversial when viewed from the standpoint of Islamic law. However, some Muslim states such as
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, Morocco, Kuwait, Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain,
and the United Arab Emirates, have specifically adopted Ibn Taimiyah’s opinion regarding the issue of a
triple talaq. Section 7 of the MFLO seems to have abolished triple talaq and thereby Ibn Taimiyah’s
position seems to have been, by implication, adopted both in Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is important
to remember that once such a law (i.e., three pronouncements of talaq in one sitting amount to, in fact,
one or two only) is passed by the relevant legislature of a Muslim state, then it becomes binding even
for those scholars who had disagreed with it before the promulgation of such a law. The reason being
that under the Islamic theory of legislation only the state has monopoly over new legislation through
“fresh ijtihad” and not individual scholars who must follow such legislation.
78High Court’s decisions that endorsed and elaborated Jiauddin include: Mst. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khaliq Lasker,
(1981) 1 GLR 375 which was divisional bench’s decision of the same High Court; Zeenat Fatema Rashid v. Md. Iqbal Anwar,
1995 AIHC 416 (Gau.; Saira Bano v. Mohd. Aslam, 1999 (3) Mh. L.J. 718; Dagdu Chotu Pathan v. Rahimbi Dagdu Pathan,
2002 (3) Mh. L.J. 602. This is a full bench decision of the Bombay High Court in which it was held that talaq must be for a
reasonable cause and must be preceded by attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife, by the
arbitrators, but the talaq may be affected if the attempt fails. Other cases are Najmunbee v. Sk. Sikandar, 2003 (2) Mh. L.J.
958; Saheda Khatoon v. Gholam Sarwar, 2002 Cri. L.J. 4150 (Cal.).
79The Supreme Court endorsed the law laid down by the High Courts, especially in the Jiauddin case in Shamim Ara v.
State of U.P. (2002) 7 SCC 518. Five years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Shamim Ara decision in Iqbal Bano v.
State of U.P., AIR 2007 SC 2215.
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